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Article One of the United States Constitution establishes the legislative branch of the federal government, the United States Congress. The Congress is a bicameral legislature consisting of a House of Representatives and a Senate. ==Section 1: Legislative power vested in Congress== Section 1 is a vesting clause, granting all the federal government's legislative authority to Congress. Similar vesting clauses are found in Articles II and III, which grant "the executive power" to the President and "the judicial power" to the federal judiciary. In legal proceedings, the working definition of "herein" connotes specificity and exclusivity. The Vesting Clauses thus establishes the principle of separation of powers by specifically giving to each branch of the federal government only those powers it can exercise and no others.〔''See Atkins v. United States'', 556 F.2d 1028, 1062 (Ct. Cl. 1977) ("The purpose of the (C )lause is to locate the central source of legislative authority in Congress, rather than the Executive or the Judiciary."), ''abrogated on other grounds by INS v. Chadha'', 462 U.S. 919 (1983).〕 This means that no branch may exercise powers that properly belong to another (e.g., since the legislative power is only vested in Congress, the executive and judiciary may not enact laws).〔See ''J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States'', 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928) ("Our Federal Constitution... divide() the governmental power into three branches. The first is the legislative, the second is the executive, and the third is the judicial, and the rule is that in the actual administration of the government Congress... should exercise the legislative power, the President... the executive power, and the courts or the judiciary the judicial power....")〕 The language "herein granted" in Article I's vesting clause has been interpreted to mean that the powers Congress are to exercise are ''exclusively'' those specifically provided for in Article I.〔See ''United States v. Lopez'', 514 U.S. 549, 592 (1995) ("() comments of Hamilton and others about federal power reflected the well-known truth that the new Government would have only the limited and enumerated powers found in the Constitution.... Even before the passage of the Tenth Amendment, it was apparent that Congress would possess only those powers 'herein granted' by the rest of the Constitution.").〕 The clause "herein granted" was further defined and elaborated by the tenth amendment. Thus, this congressional clause is contrasted by the general vesting of the executive and judicial powers in Articles II and III in the branches of government those articles govern, which has been interpreted to mean that those branches enjoy "residual" or "implied" powers beyond those specifically mentioned, as contrasted with the Congress, which is vested with those legislative powers "herein granted;"〔Compare id. with ''Myers v. United States'', 272 U.S. 52, 128 (1926) ("The difference between the grant of legislative power under article 1 to Congress which is limited to powers therein enumerated, and the more general grant of the executive power to the President under article 2 is significant. The fact that the executive power is given in general terms strengthened by specific terms where emphasis is appropriate, and limited by direct expressions where limitation is needed, and that no express limit is placed on the power of removal by the executive is a convincing indication that none was intended"), and ''Kansas v. Colorado'', 206 U.S. 46, 82 (1907) ("()n article 3, which treats of the judicial department,—and this is important for our present consideration,... § 1 reads that ‘the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court....’ By this is granted the entire judicial power of the nation.... There may be, of course, limitations on that grant of power, but, if there are any, they must be expressed; for otherwise the general grant would vest in the courts all the judicial power which the new nation was capable of exercising.").〕 however, there is substantial contemporary disagreement about the precise extent of the powers conferred by the general vesting clauses. As a corollary to the fact that Congress, and only Congress, is vested with the legislative power, Congress (in theory) cannot delegate legislative authority to other branches of government (e.g., the Executive Branch), a rule known as the nondelegation doctrine.〔See ''Touby v. United States'', 500 U.S. 160, 165 (1991) ("From th(language of this section of the Constitution ) the Court has derived the nondelegation doctrine: that Congress may not constitutionally delegate its legislative power to another branch of Government.").〕 However, the Supreme Court has ruled that Congress does have latitude to delegate regulatory powers to executive agencies as long as it provides an "intelligible principle" which governs the agency's exercise of the delegated regulatory authority.〔See ''J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co.'', 276 U.S. at 409 ("If Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to (a statutory scheme ) is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.").〕 In practice, the Supreme Court has only invalidated four statutes on non-delegation grounds in its history, three of which were invalidated in the mid-1930s. The fourth, the Line Item Veto Act of 1996, was invalidated in 1998.〔''Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns'', 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001) ("In the history of the Court we have found the requisite 'intelligible principle' lacking in only two statutes...." (citing ''Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan'', 293 U.S. 388 (1935), and ''A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States'', 295 U.S. 495 (1935))); ''Carter v. Carter Coal Co.'', 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (statute which allowed a majority of coal producers to determine legally-binding labor practices unconstitutional for delegating to private parties the ability to impose legally-binding regulations on competing firms). ''Clinton v. City of New York'', 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (Invalidated the Line Item Veto Act of 1996 on the grounds that Congress cannot delegate part of its constitutional budget-making authority to the President and was a violation of the Article 1, Section 7 Presentment Clause.)〕 The nondelegation doctrine is primarily used now as a way of interpreting a congressional delegation of authority narrowly,〔See ''Mistretta v. United States'', 488 U.S. 361, 373 n.7 (1989) (nondelegation doctrine takes the form of "giving narrow constructions to statutory delegations that might otherwise be thought to be unconstitutional").〕 in that the courts presume Congress intended only to delegate that which it certainly could have, unless it clearly demonstrates it intended to "test the waters" of what the courts would allow it to do.〔''UAW v. Occupational Health & Safety Admin.'', 938 F.2d 1310, 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ("In effect (nondelegation doctrine as a principle of statutory interpretation is used by the courts to ) require a clear statement by Congress that it intended to test the constitutional waters."); cf. ''Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council'', 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) ("()here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.... This approach not only reflects the prudential concern that constitutional issues not be needlessly confronted, but also recognizes that Congress, like this Court, is bound by and swears an oath to uphold the Constitution. The courts will therefore not lightly assume that Congress intended to infringe constitutionally protected liberties or usurp power constitutionally forbidden it." (citing ''NLRB v. Catholic Bishop'', 440 U.S. 490, 499–501, 504 (1979), and ''Grenada County Supervisors v. Brogden'', 112 U.S. 261 (1884))); ''United States v. Bass'', 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971) ("()nless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state balance.").〕 Although not specifically mentioned in the Constitution, Congress has also long asserted the power to investigate and the power to compel cooperation with an investigation.〔''Barenblatt v. United States'', 360 U.S. 109, 111 (1959) ("The power of inquiry has been employed by Congress throughout our history, over the whole range of the national interests concerning which Congress might legislate or decide upon due investigation not to legislate; it has similarly been utilized in determining what to appropriate from the national purse, or whether to appropriate."); e.g., 3 490–94 (1792) (House committee appointed to investigate the defeat of Gen. St. Clair by Indians empowered to "call for such persons, papers, and records, as may be necessary to assist their inquiries.").〕 The Supreme Court has affirmed these powers as an implication of Congress's power to legislate.〔See ''McGrain v. Daugherty'', 273 U.S. 135, 174–75 (1927) ("()he power of inquiry-with process to enforce it-is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. It was so regarded and employed in American Legislatures before the Constitution was framed and ratified.... A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information-which not infrequently is true-recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has taught that mere requests for such information often are unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion are essential to obtain what is needed. All this was true before and when the Constitution was framed and adopted. In that period the power of inquiry, with enforcing process, was regarded and employed as a necessary and appropriate attribute of the power to legislate-indeed, was treated as inhering in it. Thus there is ample warrant for thinking... that the constitutional provisions which commit the legislative function to the two houses are intended to include this attribute to the end that the function may be effectively exercised.").〕 Since the power to investigate is an aspect of Congress's power to legislate, it is as broad as Congress's powers to legislate.〔See ''Watkins v. United States'', 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957) ("The power of the Congress to conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative process. That power is broad. It encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It includes surveys of defects in our social, economic or political system for the purpose of enabling the Congress to remedy them. It comprehends probes into departments of the Federal Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste."); ''Barenblatt'', 360 U.S. at 111 ("The scope of the power of inquiry... is as penetrating and far-reaching as the potential power to enact and appropriate under the Constitution.").〕 However, it is also ''limited'' to inquiries that are "in aid of the legislative function;"〔''Kilbourn v. Thompson'', 103 U.S. 168, 189 (1881).〕 Congress may not "expose for the sake of exposure."〔''Watkins'', 354 U.S. at 200.〕 It is uncontroversial that a proper subject of Congress's investigation power is the operations of the federal government, but Congress's ability to compel the submission of documents or testimony from the President or his subordinates is often-discussed and sometimes controversial (see executive privilege), although not often litigated. As a practical matter, the limitation of Congress's ability to investigate only for a proper purpose ("in aid of" its legislative powers) functions as a limit on Congress's ability to investigate the private affairs of individual citizens; matters that simply demand action by another branch of government, without implicating an issue of public policy necessitating legislation by Congress, must be left to those branches due to the doctrine of separation of powers.〔See ''McGrain'', 273 U.S. at 170 ("()either house of Congress possesses a ‘general power of making inquiry into the private affairs of the citizen’;... the power actually possessed is limited to inquiries relating to matters of which the particular house ‘has jurisdiction’ and in respect of which it rightfully may take other action; () if the inquiry relates to ‘a matter wherein relief or redress could be had only by a judicial proceeding’ it is not within the range of this power, but must be left to the courts, conformably to the constitutional separation of governmental powers...." (quoting ''Kilbourne'', 103 U.S. at 193)); see also ''Sinclair v. United States'', 279 U.S. 263, 295 (1929) ("Congress is without authority to compel disclosures for the purpose of aiding the prosecution of pending suits...."), overruled on other grounds by ''United States v. Gaudin'', 515 U.S. 506 (1995).〕 The courts are highly deferential to Congress's exercise of its investigation powers, however. Congress has the power to investigate that which it could regulate,〔 and the courts have interpreted Congress's regulatory powers broadly since the Great Depression. Additionally, the courts will not inquire into whether Congress has an improper motive for an investigation (i.e., using a legitimate legislative purpose as a cover for "expos() for the sake of exposure"), focusing only on whether the matter is within Congress's power to regulate and, thus, investigate.〔''Barenblatt'', 360 U.S. at 132 ("So long as Congress acts in pursuance of its constitutional power, the Judiciary lacks authority to intervene on the basis of the motives which spurred the exercise of that power.").〕 Persons called before a congressional investigatory committee are entitled to the constitutional guarantees of individual rights, such as those in the Bill of Rights.〔''Id.'' at 112 ("()he Congress, in common with all branches of the Government, must exercise its powers subject to the limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental action,... () the relevant limitations of the Bill of Rights.").〕 Congress can punish those who do not cooperate with an investigation by holding violators in contempt of Congress.〔''McGrain'', 273 U.S. at 180 (upholding Senate's power to imprison an individual who did not cooperate with a valid investigation); ''Marshall v. Gordon'', 243 U.S. 521, 542 (1917) ("()he right to prevent acts which in and of themselves inherently obstruct or prevent the discharge of legislative duty or the refusal to do that which there is inherent legislative power to compel in order that legislative functions may be performed" is why Congress must be allowed to hold individuals in contempt.).〕 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Article One of the United States Constitution」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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